Introduction
There is a well-known and well-founded, if somewhat oversimple, distinction between the hermeneutics of trust (or good will) and the hermeneutics of suspicion. Commentators on Gadamer, I among them, have counted Gadamer's hermeneutics as a "hermeneutics of trust" and contrasted it with the hermeneutics of suscipion. 1 As is well-known, this latter phrase, "hermeneutics of suspicion," was coined by Paul Ricoeur in his book on Freud. 2 The 19 th century masters of such a hermeneutics are Freud and Marx. It goes without saying that they have had much influence on contemporary hermeneutics. Gadamer himself devoted an essay to the hermeneutics of suspicion, which, for whatever reason, Gadamer did not publish in German. 3 In this essay Gadamer names Nietzsche as the "inaugurator" of radical suspicion, whose "most striking instances" are to be found in the critique of ideology and psychoanalysis. Though there is an important distinction, which I do not find Gadamer anywhere recognizing, between the Enlightenment and scientific approach of Marx and Freud and what might be called the antiEnlightenment approach of Nietzsche, it is the case that all three are unmaskers in their own way.
In this paper I would like to discuss irony and ask whether the interpretation of irony calls for a kind of unmasking and how Gadamer's hermeneutics of trust deals with irony. It is noteworthy that often, when Gadamer comments on irony, he mentions Leo Strauss. Further, irony is an aspect of the challenge to the hermeneutics of trust by the hermeneutics of suspicion that motivated a development in Gadamer's hermeneutics which is evidenced in his important essay, "Text and Interpretation." Finally, as a reader of and commentator on Plato, Gadamer often has to deal with Socrates' irony. How much is the Platonic dialogue a model of the hermeneutical dialogue of the reader with the text that Gadamer wishes to foster? Does Socrates and his irony evince trust and good will toward Euthyphro or Anytus or Thrasymachus, for example?
Gadamerian Hermeneutics: A Hermeneutics of Trust and Good Will
While it may be a contentious claim to assert that the only appropriate hermeneutics is a hermeneutics of trust and good will, I do not think it a contentious claim that Gadamer advocates such a hermeneutics and defends such a claim. In short, for Gadamer, what hermeneutics is about is understanding (das Verstehen). What anyone is attempting to do in the hermeneutical situation is to understand the other, to understand the text. In this attempt to understand, one is trying to come to an understanding (Verständigung) with the other. Gadamer offers us the model of the dialogue. A basic presupposition of the dialogue, within which we attempt to come to an understanding, is good will toward the other. In the essay, "Text and Interpretation," Gadamer writes: "Thus for a written conversation basically the same fundamental condition obtains as for an oral exchange. Both partners must have the good will to try to understand one another." 4 This "good will" requires respect for the other. In addition to this, it calls for humility. Genuine listening or careful reading asks that we let the text or our partner in dialogue to speak to us and possibly correct us. He writes in a late retrospective of his work that its [hermeneutic philosophy's] modesty consists in the fact that there is no higher principle (Prinzip) than this holding oneself open to the conversation. This means, however, constantly recognizing in advance the possibility that your partner is right, even recognizing the possible superiority of your partner.
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Though it might seem a stretch to speak about the "ethics" of hermeneutics-Gadamer never uses this phrase-Gadamer clearly sees trust, humility, modesty, fidelity and carefulness as the hermeneutic virtues. 6 10 In sum, the interpreter, the mediator, humbly effaces himself or herself before the text, ideally disappearing-or doing the interpretative work such that it seems that there is no mediation, no interpretation. The interpretive work is done so well, no one notices it.
This view of the role of the interpreter and the interpretation obviously runs contrary to the hermeneutical views of critics like Harold Bloom, for whom a "strong" interpretation would replace the text interpreted. 11 The critic would replace the author. On this view, the distinction between interpretation and text, or between critic and author, does not hold. Richard Rorty, in this sense, is right to call Gadamer a "weak textualist" and not a "strong" textualist. 12 For Rorty, Bloom, Derrida and others, the interpreter's relation to the text is better characterized in terms of the will to power rather than humility, trust, respect, and good will. From this perspective the Gadamerian view is either naïve or a ploy of the will to power. From Gadamer's perspective, the mistake that such a hermeneutics makes is to make paramount in the hermeneutical situation power rather than truth. Such a hermeneutics focuses on the subjectivity of the interpreter or the power balance (or imbalance) of the participants in conversation. This certainly plays a role, according to Gadamer-but a secondary role. What is primary for Gadamer is whatever it is that is under discussion, whatever it is that the text is about, the matter at hand, die Sache. What provides the basis for any conversation is what it is about. And, briefly stated, whatever it is that is under consideration (even if we are talking about ourselves) stands in the world, a world that we have in common. These hermeneutic virtues exercised together in our common world make solidarity possible-an important theme in
Gadamer's work.
The primacy of die Sache renders authorship secondary. To say that it is secondary is not to say that it is irrelevant (or "dead"). Each of these aspects is more or less complex. Gadamer provides a contemporary version of Plato's double move in the Phaedrus of underscoring the positive importance of rhetoric and criticizing those rhetoricians who ignored the third aspect, the truth aspect, on behalf of the other aspects. 13 He also would have us recognize, just as Plato does in the Phaedrus, the difference between written and oral speech, though both of these exhibit, in their own way, each of these four dimensions.
So, one version of the hermeneutics of suspicion is the consideration of any conversation as a struggle for power, for dominance. Another related but indirect version of this hermeneutics can be found in psychoanalysis and in what the Germans call the critique of ideology (Ideologiekritik). These modes of discourse are quintessentially Enlightenment modes of discourse which take a step back from everyday discourse and behavior and criticize it from the perspective of science. Both modes of discourse might be said, in a colloquial German expression, to display themselves as Besserwisserei. That is, these scientific modes of discourse "know better" what the speaker is saying than the speaker, "know better" than the patient, "know better" than the everyday political discourse, "know better" than folk wisdom and ways. In the psychoanalytic situation the patient presumably willing submits herself or himself for therapy and psychoanalysis. Authority and power are exerted by the analyst and there may well be resistance but the paradigm of this situation is not the same as the more straightforward struggle for power we have just discussed.
Gadamer makes the case against psychoanalysis and Ideologiekritik as models of interpretive practice generally, as we all know, primarily in his exchange with Habermas at the end of the 1960's. He returns briefly to this same theme in the late essay, "Wort und Bild-'so wahr, so seiend'," when he comments on Susan Sontag's essay "Against Interpretation," which he says touches a "sore point" (wunden Punkt) concerning the "scientific interpretation of poetry and art." 14 He writes here that scientific methodology for interpretation objectivizes and brings the object of interpretation into too much light (überhellen). Sontag, in this essay, distinguishes between an older "respectful" style of interpretation and a modern "excavating" kind of interpretation. 15 Her polemic is against the latter. Her point is much like that of Nietzsche in his preface to The Gay Science where he praises the Greeks for their superficiality and urges the reader to "stop courageously at the surface." 16 Nietzsche here says further that "we no longer believe that truth remains the truth when the veils are withdrawn." This defense of superficiality and critique of unveiling separates Nietzsche, a critic of modernity and the Enlightenment, from the interpretive work of Marx and Freud. How much Nietzsche's genealogical work and exposé, for example, of Christian humility as a form of the will to power follows his own injunction for superficiality is a question we cannot pursue here. Nietzsche's strategy of genealogical unmasking runs counter to his injunction against unveiling.
There are limits to the analogy of Freudian psychoanalysis and Marx's Ideologiekritik, but it is interesting to note that the young Habermas made much of the parallel between these two modes of discourse. Central to the much discussed exchange and disagreement between
Habermas and Gadamer in the late 60's was precisely the model of psychoanalysis for hermeneutics and Ideologiekritik. As you will surely recall, Habermas in his Inaugural Lecture, embraced Gadamerian hermeneutics as providing the rules for determining "the possible meaning of the validity of statements of the cultural sciences." 17 In the same lecture, Habermas claims that psychoanalysis and the critique of ideology go beyond hermeneutics and are transformative and liberating in ways that hermeneutics is not. Gadamer's response, in short, was to point out the asymmetry and disequilibrium between the position of the analyst and the patient. Gadamer asks how the analyst might give up his mastery of the situation and participate as a partner in a conversation. 18 Gadamer also suggests that Habermas dogmatically privileges the neurotic in making psychoanalysis a paradigm of the highest form of discourse and the union of theory and practice. In the course of Habermas' development he comes to accept Gadamer's criticism in this regard. He drops the psychoanalytic situation as a paradigm for emancipatory discourse and develops a model of an ideal and distortion free speech situation in which all are partners in dialogue.
The Difficulty of Irony
Gadamer, in one of the very few places that he discusses irony, writes, half-seriously, that "it has been said, and probably not unjustly, that to interpret something as irony often is nothing but a gesture of despair on the part of the interpreter."(TI 38) Put simply, to speak ironically is to say something other than one means. How can Gadamer's hermeneutics of good will and trust come to terms with irony? If we are not suspicious with regard to the text or the other speaker, are we not likely to be duped by irony? Won't we miss it? Is not a hermeneutics of trust naïve with regard to irony? And does not this naivete expose the weakness and inappropriateness of such a hermeneutic? Further, how can Gadamer point to Plato as presenting us with a model of dialogue (as he frequently does) when the major figure in the conversation is so often ironical. Does Gadamer's interpretative practice in reading Plato display trust? Can Gadamer's Platonism and his hermeneutics be reconciled?
As noted earlier in this paper, the center of Gadamer's hermeneutics is an account of understanding (Verstehen) according to which we attempt to come to an understanding (Verständigung) with the other, be it a text or a dialogical partner. In addition to Plato, there is a second moment in the history of philosophy for which irony is extremely important and which is also important for Gadamer-the moment of German romanticism, especially the work of Friedrich Schlegel. It is telling that one of F. Schlegel's most important writings on irony is entitled: "Über die Unverständlichkeit"-literally, "On Non-understandability" or, as it has been translated, "On Incomprehensibility." 19 In short, what makes a text incomprehensible for Schlegel is irony. How does a Gadamerian hermeneutic withstand the challenge of irony and the hermeneutics of German romanticism?
Gadamer rarely discusses irony in the context of his hermeneutics, but as I will show, it has a self-acknowledged importance for Gadamer much greater than the attention he bestows on it. 20 He mentions irony only once in Truth and Method; and it is in a footnote. (TM 295) The context for this footnote is a discussion of the conditions of understanding, the conditions for properly interpreting speech in the second part of Part II which is entitled: "Elements of a theory of hermeneutic experience." Among these conditions, the first and primary condition ("erster aller") is "one's own fore-understanding" ("das Vorverständnis"). This fore-understanding or pre-understanding "comes from being concerned with the same subject (Sache)." Gadamer clarifies this by adding here: "Here again we see that understanding means, primarily, to understand the content of what is said, and only secondarily to isolate and understand another's meaning as such."(TM 294) This fore-understanding is a fore-conception (Vorgriff) of completeness, that is, a preconception of the whole of which whatever is before our attention is a part. The part is understood in terms of the whole. In coming to terms with any part, we are always projecting the whole within which it stands.
In ourselves with what the author or speaker ironically means-that is, that the intention of the author would become primary in this context. But note that Gadamer insists 1) that such texts are the exception (Ausnahmefall), and 2) that the key to the unmasking of irony is our understanding of the subject matter. Even here die Sache is primary. In our understanding of the subject matter we find ourselves in agreement with the speaker or author and with the ironic meaning of the text.
In this footnote just cited, Gadamer mentions Leo Strauss and his book Persecution and the Art of Writing, which, for Gadamer, is both enlightening and problematic. He takes up again the question of irony and Strauss's treatment of it in "Supplement I: Hermeneutics and Historicism" which he adds to the second edition of Truth and Method (1965). 21 Here he reiterates his claim that "even Plato's artistic irony can be understood only by someone who shares his knowledge of the subject matter (as is the case with all irony)."(TM 538) As I will discuss later in this essay,
Gadamer here goes on to criticize Strauss and the Straussians for taking the concern for irony too far in their interpretations of Plato and other philosophers.
It is only in the important and pivotal essay, "Truth and Interpretation" that Gadamer provides us a context within his hermeneutics by which we might understand irony. 22 The essay is written both to develop some central themes of Truth and Method and to open a conversation with Jacques Derrida. As we have noted, Gadamer develops his hermeneutics and his account of understanding in large part on the basis of an analogy between conversation and the interpretation of texts. In this address Gadamer wishes to recognize the limit of the analogy and to challenge Derrida. Contra Derrida, everything is not to be considered a text. 23 Also, we should recognize the distinction between spoken and written speech. Further, even among fixed and written speeches, there are important distinctions to be made. In short, all that is written is not, on Gadamer's account, a text. Here Gadamer distinguishes texts from three "oppositional forms," that is, three forms of writing that appear in the form of a text but are not genuine texts.
These are antitexts (Antitexte), pseudotexts (Pseudotexte), and pretexts (Prätexte). The primary example of an antitext is a joke. The dominant factor here, according to Gadamer, is the situation of the discourse which signals that the statement is to be taken as a joke and not seriously. Outside that situation it is difficult to tell whether the statement is to be taken seriously or as a joke. Outside that situation the joke is often not funny; the joke "cannot be repeated."(TI 37) Gadamer goes on to say that "basically, the same applies to another quite classical form of mutual agreement, namely, irony."(TI 37) It may seem surprising that
Gadamer claims that the dissimulation of irony aims at solidarity, but Gadamer's claim echoes the brief account of irony in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (Bk IV) where Aristotle counts irony as one of the extremes for which the mean is truthfulness-and is thus a vice. Yet the selfdeprecation of the ironist is attractive and noble inasmuch as it does not seek its own advantage and spares others the feeling of inferiority. 24 The hermeneutic difficulty of dealing with irony and with such anti-texts occurs when there is a cultural distance from the text, temporal or spatial (cultural), such that the reader does not share or is unclear about this set of prior cultural understandings. In his later work Gadamer is much concerned with the limits of language and the limits of understanding. For him, this concern for limits is simply the other side of the concern for the conditions of understanding, which is closely tied to language and which predominates in Truth and Method.
The text, which is simply linguistic-that is, words on a page--may evoke lived experience and the limits of speech and understanding through words. We see the priority of the spoken even for the text which is not derived from the spoken as Gadamer develops his account of the text by discussing the text's "ideality" and the reader's "inner ear."(TI 43, 51) 34 Gadamer writes:
Its linguistic presence as text is such as to demand repetition of the words in the original power of their sound-not in such a way as to reach back to some original speaking of them, however, but rather looking forward toward a new, ideal speaking. (TI 44) The text prescribes how it is to be read. In this reading, though it be silent, we hear it in our "inner ear." In this engagement we are to be primarily concerned with what the text is about-its claim to truth. Just as Plato makes clear to us, in coming to terms with the text we have to consider the relationship of word and deed, logos and ergon.
Irony is a borderline case; it shows us "the limits of writing." It is on the boundary, because, although it is primarily to be found in spoken speech, it can, with difficulty, be written.
The best example for Gadamer of ironical writing is Plato and the ironical speech of Socrates.
Plato is also the exemplar of irony for Schlegel and Kierkegaard. Plato provides us with conversations, that is, the spoken, but as written and, quite surely, not as notes nor as a transcript of a conversation but as a carefully crafted literary philosophical work. The textuality of Plato's texts is an extremely complicated matter for Gadamer-too complicated for us to adequately deal with it here. Two large aspects of this complication concern, one, the distinction of philosophy and literature, and, two, irony. The distinction between literature and philosophy is an important one for Gadamer. Philosophy, he argues, does not provide us with "eminent" texts.
Philosophical works, like the work of Penelope, constantly undo themselves as they find their place in the larger philosophical conversation. 35 Yet the example of Plato's work clearly challenges this distinction of literature and philosophy. Gadamer frequently refers to his artistry.
Secondly, not only is one of his characters, namely Socrates, ironic, but Plato's own writing is Friedländer shows us that not only is there Socratic irony but also Plato's artistic irony. 36 Gadamer also speaks here, following Friedländer, of Plato's literary accomplishment: "the most perfected (vollendeste) artistic accomplishment of the entire Greek literature."(GW V, 225)
But how are we to understand the written and textual status of ironical texts such as those that Plato presents us with? We noted above how Gadamer distinguishes between texts and antitexts. He considers irony an antitext. Taken simply and straightforwardly, this would mean that, in the strict sense, Plato's writings are not to be considered texts. In light of the Gadamerian distinction between literature and philosophy, between eminent texts and noneminent texts, one might be led to say that for Gadamer, philosophy does not provide eminent texts in any case. Thus Plato's writings on this account alone are not texts. But if Plato is as much a literary artist as he is a philosopher, his writings ask for consideration as eminent texts.
Further, how are we to consider prominent literary texts that are ironical. Thomas Mann, for example, writes with irony. Are his writings then anti-texts and not texts?
It is one thing for a character in the text to speak ironically and another for the author to "diatribe against writing" in the Phaedrus. 37 Derrida proclaims the priority, rather, of writing.
Not wishing to simply reverse a binary opposition, the opposition of the spoken and the written, he suggests that all linguistic expression, spoken or written, is a form of writing. 38 The trace of writing, the supplement of writing, remains and shows itself. His interpretation culminates in his treatment of Socrates' statement, late in the dialogue in the context of the discussion of writing, that spoken discourse is "inscribed" or "written" on the soul. Derrida here says a number of things here that are telling:
1) That Socrates is "for the first time" led to envision speech as legitimate writing;
2) That the reader and Plato have "usually assumed" that what we are dealing with is a metaphor;
3) That for Plato and for "all of Western philosophy…metaphoricity is the logic of contamination and the contamination of logic," 4) That it is "remarkable that the so-called living discourse should be suddenly described by a 'metaphor' borrowed from the order of the very thing one is trying to exclude from it," and 5) "Yet this borrowing is rendered necessary by that which structurally links the intelligible to its repetition in the copy, and the language describing dialectics cannot fail to call upon it."
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In short, the metaphor is a slip by Plato. This metaphor, this mistake by Plato, shows us the trace and the supplement that cannot be repressed. Much of Derrida's language in the interpretive telling of the dialogue is in the passive voice, e.g., "Socrates is led for the first time to envision…." The passive voice is indicative of the "structural necessity" of which Derrida writes. Though Plato dreams of eliminating it, it has a necessity, according to Derrida, which cannot be repressed. Plato's dream that cannot come true.
Two things about his reading stand out, especially in the context of our concerns here.
First, his reading is flat and without a sense for Plato's irony. 41 In this regard he is much like In addition, Gadamer, like Strauss, takes seriously the notion of a "hidden doctrine."
And, like Strauss, too, Gadamer thinks we can make some sense of this on the basis of the dialogues. But unlike Strauss, Gadamer does not find this primarily motivated by politics and the threat to the life of the philosopher. Rather it has more to do with the limits of writing. For
Gadamer, it is not so much a matter of having a hidden doctrine as having an oral teaching. 45 "Oral instruction," he writes, "stands under a different law." 46 This "different law" follows from the continuity of what was said before and after and from the knowledge of one another in community. Though Gadamer points to the harmony of the Seventh Letter with the Phaedrus in regard to the oral and the written, and he relies on these two texts to make his case about the oral teaching, he violates Plato's prohibition in the Seventh Letter when he, Gadamer, speculates about the oral teaching, about which he thinks we can make some reasonable, though qualified, assertions based on the written tradition together with the dialogues. But it is not for us here to concern ourselves further with Gadamer's speculations about the oral teaching. We have taken this into account to mark the difference of his approach to this matter with that of Strauss and to mark again the primacy of the spoken for Gadamer..
Finally, it is important to note that Gadamer not only points out the limits of writing, but that he is concerned to point out as well the limits of oral speech, that is the limits of speech or logos as such. In the two essays where Gadamer writes about the Seventh Letter and the unwritten doctrine or teaching, he argues that fundamental to Plato's "doctrine" is Plato's appreciation of "the weakness of the logoi" and "the limitedness of all human knowing." 47 All three of these contemporary hermeneuts-Gadamer, Derrida, and Strauss-would agree about our human limits, our finitude. But Gadamer and Strauss see it as something positively embraced by Plato, while Derrida does not. Derrida rather follows Nietzsche and sees in Plato and even in Socrates ressentiment about our human condition.
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Above all for Gadamer, this limit of understanding is displayed in our understanding of ourselves, in self-understanding. He takes seriously Socrates' ironic statement in the Phaedrus that he has yet to fulfill the injunction of the Delphic oracle: "to know myself."(229e) Like his other ironic statements, there is a sense in which the statement is meant and a sense in which the statement is not meant. Though Socrates knows himself better than his fellow Athenians (witness Socrates' self defense in the Apology), the task is an open one that can never be completed. Paradoxically, our own self-understanding is best attained in dialogue with others about matters that concern us all.
NOTES
1 See my "The World Never Lost: The Hermeneutics of Trust," Philosophy and Phenomenological
